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1ABSTRACT
We investigate the implications of two protective properties, sustain-
ability and exemption, when imposed separately in conjunction with other
basic properties for the resolution of con°icting claims. Under the pro-
tective properties, agents with su±ciently small claims in relation to the
others are fully reimbursed. We show that the constrained equal awards
rule is the only rule satisfying (1) sustainability and claims monotonicity,
(2) sustainability and super-modularity, and (3) exemption, order preser-
vation, and bilateral consistency. Then, we extend the notions of the
protective properties to groups of agents, and show that no rule satis¯es
any of these extensions. Journal of Economic Literature Classi¯cation
Numbers: D63, D74.
Keywords: claims problems; sustainability; exemption; constrained equal
awards rule.
paper is based on my Ph.D. thesis at the University of Rochester. I am responsible for
any remaining de¯ciency.
21 Introduction
We consider the problem of distributing an in¯nitely divisible and homo-
geneous resource among agents having claims on it. An example is when
the liquidation value of a bankrupt ¯rm has to be divided among its cred-
itors. A rule is a function that associates with each problem of this kind,
called a \claims problem", a division of the amount available, called an
\awards vector". How should the division be performed? The literature
devoted to the search for the desirable rules is initiated by O'Neill [7].1
Our goal is to conduct a systematic analysis of two \protective" prop-
erties introduced by Herrero and Villar [5,6]. The properties are intended
to fully reimburse agents with relatively small claims. Such preferential
treatment is a common phenomenon in the world. For example, think
of the interpretation of a claims problem as a particular tax-assessment
problem. Here agents' claims correspond to their pre-taxed incomes, and
the amount available to \the total amount of their post-taxed incomes"
(the di®erence between the sum of their pre-taxed incomes and the to-
tal amount of income taxes). How should agents' post-taxed incomes be
assigned?2 We often observe that agents with relatively low incomes are
exempted from income taxation. In other words, their pre-taxed incomes
are equal to their post-taxed incomes. The question is how small a claim
should be relative to both other claims and the amount available to make
the protective treatment desirable.
Herrero and Villar [5,6] formulate two standards of smallness: agent
i's claim ci is \sustainable" if truncating all claims at ci results in a sit-
uation where there is enough to fully reimburse everyone; agent i's claim
ci is \exemptive" if it is not greater than equal division. The ¯rst prop-
1For a comprehensive survey of this literature, see Thomson [10].
2This problem can be understood as the \dual" of the tax-assessment problem
considered by Young [15,16]. In that model, agents' claims correspond to their pre-
taxed incomes, and the amount available to the total amount of income taxes. Thus,
Young's tax-assessment problem focuses on how to allocate the total amount of income
taxes. However, our tax-assessment problem emphasizes on how to assign agents' post-
taxed incomes.
3erty, sustainability, says that if an agent's claim is sustainable, he should
be fully compensated. The second property, exemption, says that if an
agent's claim is exemptive, he should be fully compensated. Note that
sustainability implies exemption. However, the converse is not true. For
a rule satisfying a variable-population property to be de¯ned shortly, ex-
emption implies sustainability (Proposition 1).
Herrero and Villar [5,6] ¯nd that the constrained equal awards rule3,
which assigns equal amounts to all agents subject to no one receiving more
than his claim, satis¯es sustainability. They then base characterizations
of the rule on this property when imposed in conjunction with two other
appealing properties. The ¯rst one is a composition property. When the
amount available decreases from some initial value, there are two ways to
look at the situation. We can cancel the initial division and recalculate
the awards for the revised amount available. Alternatively, we can take
the initial awards calculated on the basis of the initial amount available
as claims in dividing the revised amount available. Composition down
(Moulin [8]) says that both procedures should produce the same awards
vector. The second one is the variable-population property alluded to in
the previous paragraph. Suppose that an awards vector is chosen for a
problem. Consistency (Aumann and Maschler [1]; Young [15,16]) says
that this awards vector should be in agreement with the awards vector
chosen for any problem obtained by imagining some agents leaving with
their awards, and re-evaluating the situation from the viewpoint of the
remaining agents.4
Herrero and Villar [5,6] show that the constrained equal awards rule
is the only rule satisfying sustainability and composition down, and that
it is the only rule satisfying exemption, composition down, and \bilateral
consistency"5. Composition down is an attractive property but unfortu-
3For earlier references, see Aumann and Maschler [1] and Dagan [3].
4For a comprehensive survey of the literature on consistency and its converse, see
Thomson [11].
5It is a weaker version of consistency, which restricts attention to two-agent sub-
groups.
4nately it is not satis¯ed by many well-known rules, such as the \Talmud
rule"6. One may wonder whether the characterizations could be obtained
by replacing composition down with some other property that would be
satis¯ed more generally. We will identify several such properties.
We consider ¯rst claims monotonicity. It says that when an agent's
claim increases, he should not receive less than what he did initially. We
show that, surprisingly, this very mild property and sustainability to-
gether are satis¯ed only by the constrained equal awards rule (Theorem 1).
Next, we turn to two order properties. Order preservation (Aumann and
Maschler [1]) says that of two agents, the one with the larger claim should
not receive less than the other. Also, his loss (the di®erence between his
claim and his award) should not be less than the other's. Super-modularity
(Dagan, Serrano, and Volij [4]) says that when the amount available in-
creases, of two agents, the one with the larger claim should not receive a
smaller share of the increment than the other. We show that sustainability
and super-modularity are satis¯ed only by the constrained equal awards
rule (Theorem 2), and that exemption, order preservation, and bilateral
consistency are satis¯ed only by the rule (Theorem 3).
We replace composition down in Theorem 2.1 of Herrero and Villar [5]
with claims monotonicity or super-modularity. In addition, composition
down in Theorem 2 of Herrero and Villar [6] is replaced with order preser-
vation. These replacements are signi¯cant since a number of well-known
rules satisfy claims monotonicity, super-modularity, and order preserva-
tion, but not composition down. Examples are the Talmud rule, \Piniles
rule", and the \random arrival rule".
In the case of claims problems, suppose that a rule is characterized
by a list of properties for problems involving only two agents. In ad-
dition, it satis¯es bilateral consistency and a converse of this property,
\converse consistency". Then, its characterization can be extended to
more than two agents by imposing bilateral consistency or converse con-
6This rule is de¯ned by Aumann and Maschler [1] to rationalize the recommenda-
tions made in the Talmud for several numerical examples.
5sistency. Such extensions are immediate consequences of the \Elevator
Lemma", which states that if a rule satis¯es bilateral consistency, and
in the two-agent case, coincides with some other rule that satis¯es con-
verse consistency, then the two rules coincide in general.7 For instance,
the constrained equal awards rule is the only rule satisfying sustainability
and composition down (Herrero and Villar [5] Theorem 2.1). Note that
sustainability and exemption are equivalent in the two-agent case. Thus,
the rule is the only rule satisfying exemption and composition down in
that case. Since it satis¯es bilateral consistency and converse consistency,
the Elevator Lemma gives us two results: the constrained equal awards
rule is the only rule satisfying exemption, composition down, and bilateral
consistency (Herrero and Villar [6] Theorem 2), and it is the only rule sat-
isfying exemption, composition down, and converse consistency (Yeh [14]
Theorem 2).
Therefore, the Elevator lemma and our new characterizations of the
constrained equal awards rule together give us another group of charac-
terizations of the rule: it is the only rule satisfying exemption, claims
monotonicity, and bilateral consistency (Proposition 2) or converse con-
sistency (Proposition 3), and it is the only rule satisfying exemption,
super-modularity, and bilateral consistency (Proposition 4) or converse
consistency (Proposition 5).
Finally, we formulate versions of sustainability and exemption for groups
by taking the arithmetic average of claims of a group of agents. We show
that no rule satis¯es any of them (Theorems 4 and 5). Thus, taking the
arithmetic average of claims of a group of agents to extend the notions of
the protective properties is too demanding.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the
model, the constrained equal awards rule, and the protective properties.
7The lemma is introduced by Thomson [11] and stated in a \model-free" fashion.
It says that if a (possibly multi-valued) rule satis¯es consistency and is a subrule of a
conversely consistent rule in the two-agent case, then the inclusion holds in general.
The lemma as stated here is the special case for single-valued rules. For this expression
and a study of the lemma, see Thomson [11].
6In Section 3 we present our results and check the independence of the
properties appearing in each of our characterizations. In Sections 4 and 5,
we state the dual parts of our characterizations, and extend the ideas of
the protective properties to groups of agents. Following Section 5 is the
conclusion.
2 The model, the constrained equal awards
rule, and the protective properties
There is an in¯nite set of \potential" agents, indexed by the set of natural
numbers N. Let N be the class of ¯nite subsets of N. Given N 2 N, an
amount available E 2 R+ of an in¯nitely divisible and homogeneous
resource has to be distributed among a group of agents N having claims
on it.8 For each i 2 N, let ci be agent i0s claim. Let c ´ (ci)i2N be




i2N ci ¸ E.9 Let CN be the class of claims problems. An
awards vector for (c;E) 2 CN is a point x 2 RN such that 0 5 x 5 c
and
P
i2N xi = E.10 Let X (c;E) be the set of all awards vectors for
(c;E). A rule is a function de¯ned on
S
N2N CN that associates with each
N 2 N and each claims problem (c;E) 2 CN an awards vector in X (c;E).
Our generic notation for rules is '. For each group N0 ½ N, we denote
cN0 ´ (ci)i2N0, 'N0 (c;E) ´ ('i (c;E))i2N0, and so on.
We now formally de¯ne the constrained equal awards rule and the
protective properties.
Constrained equal awards rule, CEA: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2
CN, and each i 2 N, CEAi(c;E) ´ minfci;¸g, where ¸ is chosen such
that
P
i2N CEAi (c;E) = E.
8By R+ we denote the set of real numbers, R+ ´ fx 2 R j x ¸ 0g.
9By RN
+ we denote the Cartesian product of jNj copies of R+, indexed by the
elements of N.
10Vector inequalities: x = y, x ¸ y, and x > y.
7Sustainability: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN, and each i 2 N,
if
P
j2N minfcj;cig · E, then 'i (c;E) = ci.
Exemption: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN and each i 2 N, if
ci · E
jNj, then 'i (c;E) = ci.
Note that sustainability and exemption are equivalent in the two-agent
case, and that sustainability implies exemption in general. Moreover, as
we show in the next section, exemption, when imposed together with a
variable-population property to be de¯ned shortly, implies sustainability.
3 The results
The following lemma plays an important role in our presentation. To
introduce it, we de¯ne two variable-population properties. Consider a
problem and suppose that a rule has been chosen to solve the problem.
Then, an awards vector is obtained for the problem. Now, imagine that
some agents leave with their awards. The ¯rst variable-population prop-
erty says that when the situation is re-evaluated from the viewpoint of
the remaining agents, the rule should recommend the same awards for the
remaining agents as initially.
Consistency: For each N 2 N, each N0 ½ N, and each (c;E) 2 CN, if







A weaker version of consistency is de¯ned by restricting attention to
two-agent subgroups.
Bilateral consistency: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN, and each







Suppose that an awards vector x for a problem is such that its restric-
tion to each two-agent group would be chosen by the rule for the problem
of dividing between them the sum of their components of x. The second
8variable-population property says that x should be chosen by the rule for
the original problem.
Converse consistency: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN, and each







then x = '(c;E).
The lemma is known as the Elevator Lemma.
Elevator Lemma (Thomson [11]) If a rule ' is bilaterally consistent and
coincides with a conversely consistent rule '0 in the two-agent case, then
' coincides with '0 in general.
Proof. See Thomson [11].
Notice that sustainability implies exemption. However, it is easy to
check that the converse is not true. As we show next, provided consistency
holds, exemption implies sustainability. Let n be the cardinality of N.
Proposition 1 If a rule satis¯es exemption and consistency, then it sat-
is¯es sustainability.
Proof. Let ' be a rule satisfying exemption and consistency. Let N 2 N







j2N minfcj;cig · E
o
. We
assume that Nsus (c;E) 6= ; since otherwise there is nothing to check. Let
j ´ maxfi 2 Nsus (c;E)j for each k 2 Nsus (c;E), ck · cig. Without loss
of generality, we assume that c1 · c2 · ¢¢¢ · cn. It follows that for each
k 2 f1;2;:::;jg, k 2 Nsus (c;E). We show that for each k 2 f1;2;:::;jg,
'k(c;E) = ck. The proof is by induction on k.
Case 1: k = 1. Since j 2 Nsus (c;E), then
Pj¡1
k=1 ck + (n ¡ j + 1)cj ·
E. Note that c1 · c2 · ¢¢¢ · cn. Thus, nc1 · E. By exemption,
'1(c;E) = c1.
Case 2: k > 1. By induction hypothesis, suppose that for each k 2
f1;2;:::;tg, 'k (c;E) = ck, where t 2 N such that t < j. We show
9¸
r c1 x1 = y1
r c2 x2 = y2
r
c3















Figure 1: Illustration of the Proof of Theorem 1. The claims of
agents 1 and 2 are sustainable. Agent 4 receives the smallest amount
among the agents whose claims are not sustainable.
that 't+1 (c;E) = ct+1. Let N0 ´ ft + 1;t + 2;¢¢¢;ng. Since
Pj¡1
k=1 ck +










= ct+1. By induction
hypothesis, for each k 2 f1;2;:::;tg, 'k (c;E) = ck. By consistency,






. Thus, 't+1 (c;E) = ct+1. Q.E.D.
3.1 Claims monotonicity
We ¯rst investigate the implication of sustainability when imposed to-
gether with a monotonicity property. This property says that if an agent's
claim increases, he should not receive less than what he did initially.11
Claims monotonicity: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN, each i 2 N,
and each c0
i 2 R+, if c0
i > ci, then 'i (c0
i;c¡i;E) ¸ 'i (c;E).
All well-known rules satisfy this property. Examples are the \propor-
tional" rule, the constrained equal awards rule, the \constrained equal
losses" rule (Dagan [3]), Piniles' rule (Piniles [9]), random arrival rule,
and the Talmud rule. Observe that among them, the constrained equal
awards rule is the only rule satisfying sustainability. In fact, as we show
next, sustainability and claims monotonicity altogether are satis¯ed only
by this rule.
11By the notation (c0
i;c¡i), we mean the claims vector c in which the i-th component
has been replaced by c0
i and c¡i ´ (cj)j2Nnfig.
10Theorem 1 The constrained equal awards rule is the only rule satisfying
sustainability and claims monotonicity.
Proof. (Figure 1) Obviously, the constrained equal awards rule satis¯es
the two properties. Conversely, let ' be a rule satisfying the properties.
Let N 2 N and (c;E) 2 CN. Without loss of generality, we assume that







j2N minfcj;cig · E
o
,
x ´ CEA(c;E), and y ´ '(c;E). We show that x = y.
Suppose, by contradiction, that x 6= y. By sustainability, for each
i 2 Nsus (c;E), yi = ci. Thus, for each i 2 Nsus (c;E), yi = xi. Note that
for each i 2 NnNsus (c;E), xi = ¸ < ci where ¸ is such that
P





i2N yi and x 6= y, there is k 2 NnNsus (c;E) such
that yk < ¸ < ck. Let j 2 NnNsus (c;E) be such that yj = ymin ´
mini2NnNsus(c;E) yi. Since yj · yk and j 2 NnNsus (c;E), then yj < ¸ < cj.
Let c0 be such that c0
j ´ ¸ and c0
¡j ´ c¡j. Note that yj < c0
















= E. By sustainability, 'j(c0;E) = c0
j = ¸. By
claims monotonicity, 'j(c0;E) · 'j (c;E). Thus, ¸ · yj in violation of
¸ > yj. Q.E.D.
Notice that exemption is equivalent to sustainability in the two-agent
case, and that the constrained equal awards rule is bilaterally consistent
and conversely consistent. With these facts, the next two results are im-
mediate consequences of Theorem 1 and the Elevator Lemma together.
Proposition 2 The constrained equal awards rule is the only rule satis-
fying exemption, claims monotonicity, and bilateral consistency.
Proof. Obviously, the constrained equal awards rule satis¯es the three
properties. Conversely, let ' be a rule satisfying the properties. Note that
exemption is equivalent to sustainability in the two-agent case. Thus,
Theorem 1 implies that ' = CEA in that case. Note that ' is bilater-
ally consistent, and that the constrained equal awards rule is conversely
consistent. By the Elevator Lemma, ' = CEA in general. Q.E.D.
11Proposition 3 The constrained equal awards rule is the only rule satis-
fying exemption, claims monotonicity, and converse consistency.
Proof. Obviously, the constrained equal awards rule satis¯es the three
properties. Conversely, let ' be a rule satisfying the properties. Note that
exemption is equivalent to sustainability in the two-agent case. Thus,
Theorem 1 implies that ' = CEA in that case. Note that ' is conversely
consistent, and that the constrained equal awards rule is bilaterally con-
sistent. By the Elevator Lemma, ' = CEA in general. Q.E.D.
3.2 Super-modularity
We next switch our attention to an order property. It says that when the
amount available increases, of two agents, the one with the larger claim
should not receive a smaller share of the increment than the other (Dagan,
Serrano, and Volij [4]).
Super-modularity: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN, each E < E0,
and each pair fi;jg µ N, if
P
i2N ci ¸ E0 and ci · cj, then 'i (c;E0) ¡
'i (c;E) · 'j (c;E0) ¡ 'j (c;E).
All rules we have mentioned in Section 3.1 satisfy this property. How-
ever, there is no logical relation between claims monotonicity and super-
modularity. The \constrained egalitarian rule" (Chun, Schummer, and
Thomson [2]) satis¯es the former but not the latter. The following rule
satis¯es the latter but not the former. Given N 2 N and (c;E) 2 CN
with c1 · c2 · ¢¢¢ · cn, if N ´ fi;jg and cj = 2ci, then we apply the
Talmud rule; otherwise, we apply the proportional rule.
Note that super-modularity implies another order property de¯ned
next. It says that of two agents, the one with the larger claim should
not receive less than the other. Also, his loss should not be less than the
other's (Aumann and Maschler [1]).
Order preservation: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN, and each pair
12r c1 x1 = y1































Figure 2: Illustration of the Proof of Theorem 2. The claims of
agents 1 and 2 are sustainable. Agent 2 receives the largest amount among
the agents whose claims are sustainable.
fi;jg µ N, if ci · cj, then 'i (c;E) · 'j (c;E). Also, ci ¡ 'i (c;E) ·
cj ¡ 'j (c;E).
We use this implication to prove the next result.
Theorem 2 The constrained equal awards rule is the only rule satisfying
sustainability and super-modularity.
Proof. (Figure 2) Obviously, the constrained equal awards rule satis¯es
these properties. Conversely, let ' be a rule satisfying the properties. Let
N 2 N and (c;E) 2 CN. Without loss of generality, we assume that







j2N minfcj;cig · E
o
,
x ´ CEA(c;E), and y ´ '(c;E). We show that x = y.
Suppose, by contradiction, that x 6= y. By sustainability, for each
i 2 Nsus (c;E), yi = ci. Thus, for each i 2 Nsus (c;E), xi = yi. Let
k ´ maxfi 2 Nsus (c;E) j for each j 2 Nsus (c;E), yj · yig. Note that
ck < ck+1 · ¢¢¢ · cn. Since super-modularity implies the ¯rst part of
order preservation, yk · yk+1 · yk+2 · ¢¢¢ · yn. Note that for each
i 2 Nsus (c;E), yi = xi, and that for each i 2 NnNsus (c;E), xi = ¸ < ci
where ¸ is such that
P




i2N yi and x 6= y, it
follows that yk+1 < ¸ < ck+1, and that there is j > k+1 such that ¸ < yj ·
cj. Thus, yk+1 < yj. Let E0 ´
P
i2Nsus(c;E) ci + jNnNsus (c;E)jck+1. Since
ck+1 · ck+2 · ¢¢¢ · cn, then E0 ·
P
i2N ci. Thus, (c;E0) is well-de¯ned.
Since for each i 2 NnNsus (c;E), ¸ < ci, then E < E0. Let y0 ´ '(c;E0).
Note that
P
i2N minfci;ck+1g = E0, and that c1 · c2 · ¢¢¢ · cn. By
13sustainability, for each i · k + 1, y0
i = ci. Note that ck+1 · cj. By the






and that for each i · k + 1, y0
i = ci. It follows that y0
j = y0
k+1 = ck+1.
Thus, when the amount available increases from E to E0, the increments
of agents k+1 and j are y0
k+1¡yk+1 = ck+1¡yk+1 and y0
j ¡yj = ck+1¡yj.
Recall that yk+1 < yj. It follows that y0
k+1 ¡yk+1 > y0
j ¡yj in violation of
super-modularity. Q.E.D.
Again, the next two propositions are immediate consequences of The-
orem 2 and the Elevator Lemma together. We state them without proofs.
Proposition 4 The constrained equal awards rule is the only rule satis-
fying exemption, super-modularity, and bilateral consistency.
Proposition 5 The constrained equal awards rule is the only rule satis-
fying exemption, super-modularity, and converse consistency.
3.3 Order preservation
In the proof of Theorem 2, we use the fact that super-modularity implies
order preservation. One may wonder whether super-modularity can be
replaced with order preservation in Theorem 2, Propositions 4 and 5. The
answer is no except in Proposition 4. The following example demonstrates
that if we replace super-modularity with order preservation in Theorem 2,
the constrained equal awards rule is not the only acceptable rule.






(0;E) if N ´ fi;jg, ci < cj, and E · ci,
(E ¡ ci;ci) if N ´ fi;jg, ci < cj, and ci < E · 2ci,
(ci;E ¡ ci) if N ´ fi;jg, ci < cj, and 2ci < E · ci + cj,
CEA(c;E) otherwise.
The next example is a rule that di®ers from the constrained equal
awards rule and satis¯es exemption, order preservation, and converse con-
sistency.




'¤ (c;E) if N ´ f1;2g,
CEA(c;E) otherwise .
However, as we show next, if we replace super-modularity with order
preservation in Proposition 4, the constrained equal awards rule is still
the only rule satisfying exemption, order preservation, and bilateral con-
sistency. Thus, Proposition 4 can be seen as a corollary of the next result.
Theorem 3 The constrained equal awards rule is the only rule satisfying
exemption, order preservation, and bilateral consistency.
Proof. Obviously, the constrained equal awards rule satis¯es the three
properties. The proof of uniqueness is in two steps. Step 1 establishes
that in the two-agent case, if a rule satis¯es the three properties, then
it is the constrained equal awards rule. Step 2 completes the proof by
applying Step 1 and the Elevator Lemma. Let ' be a rule satisfying the
three properties.
Step 1: For each N 2 N with jNj = 2 and each (c;E) 2 CN,
'(c;E) = CEA(c;E):
Let N ´ fi;jg 2 N and (c;E) 2 CN. Without loss of generality, we







j2N minfcj;cig · E
o
,
x ´ CEA(c;E), and y ´ '(c;E). We show that x = y. If jNsus (c;E)j =
2, then E =
P
k2N ck. It follows that x = y. If jNsus (c;E)j = 1, then




k2N yk = E, then yj = xj. If jNsus (c;E)j = 0, then xi = xj = E
2 . Let
l 2 NnN be an agent with claim cl ´ E
2 . Let N0 ´ fl;i;jg, c0 ´ (cl;ci;cj)




k = ci + cj ¸ E and c0
l = cl = E
2 ,
then (c0;E0) is well-de¯ned. Note that c0
l = E
2 = E0
3 . By exemption,
'l(c0;E0) = E0
3 . Since jNsus (c;E)j = 0, then E





j. By order preservation, 'l (c0;E0) · 'i (c0;E0) · 'j (c0;E0). Note
that
P
k2N0 'k (c0;E0) = E0, and that 'l (c0;E0) = E0
3 . Thus, 'i (c0;E0) =
15'j (c0;E0) = E0
3 . When agent l leaves with his award E0
3 , the reduced prob-
lem with respect to fi;jg and '(c0;E0) is equivalent to (c;E). By bilateral













= 'j (c;E). Since 'i (c0;E0) = 'j (c0;E0) = E0
3 = E
2 ,
then x = y.
Step 2: Completion of the proof.
Notice that the constrained equal awards rule is conversely consistent.
By Step 1 and the Elevator Lemma, we conclude that ' = CEA. Q.E.D.
3.4 Independence of the properties
Here, we discuss what additional rules would be made possible by removing
one property at a time from the list appearing in each of previous results.
For this purpose, we introduce the following rules. The ¯rst rule assigns
amounts so as to equate the losses experienced by all agents subject to no
one receiving a negative amount.
Constrained equal losses rule, CEL: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2
CN, and each i 2 N, CELi(c;E) ´ maxf0;ci ¡ ¸g, where ¸ is chosen
such that
P
i2N CELi(c;E) = E.
The second one assigns equal amounts to the agents with the smallest
claim until they are fully compensated. The remainder is then divided
similarly to the agents with the second smallest claim, and so on.
Example 3 (Herrero and Villar [5]) Let '0 be de¯ned as follows. Let





¯ci = minj2Nn[s<kNs(c) cj
ª
and yk ´ minj2Nn[s<kNs(c) cj.






















16Property n Rule CEL '0 '00 '¤¤
sustainability No Yes No Yes
exemption No Yes Yes Yes
claim monotonicity Yes No Yes No
super-modularity Yes No Yes No
order preservation Yes No Yes Yes
bilateral consistency Yes Yes No No
converse consistency Yes Yes No Yes
Table 1: Independence of the properties in each of our results
The last one consists of two parts. The ¯rst part deals with the situa-
tions in which the number of agents is 3 and agents' claims are di®erent.
When equal division is at most as large as the smallest claim, the rule
assigns equal amounts to all agents. When equal division is greater than
the smallest claim, the rule fully reimburses the agent with the smallest
claim. Then the agent with the second smallest claim receives equal di-
vision plus one-third of the di®erence between the equal division and the
smallest claim. The last agent then receives the remainder. Continue this
procedure subject to no one receiving more than his claim; otherwise, the
constrained equal awards rule is applied.
Example 4 (Yeh [14]) Let '00 be de¯ned as follows. Let N 2 N and
(c;E) 2 CN. Without loss of generality, we assume that c1 · c2 ·




'¤¤¤ (c;E) if jNj = 3 and for each pairfi;jg ½ N, ci 6= cj,
CEA(c;E) otherwise.
where '¤¤¤ is de¯ned as follows: let N ´ fi;j;kg and (c;E) 2 CN with



























(ci;cj;E ¡ ci ¡ cj)
if E
3 · ci,





17Table 1 shows that the properties appearing in each of our results are
independent. For example, '0 satis¯es sustainability but not claims mono-
tonicity. The constrained equal losses rule satis¯es claims monotonicity
but not sustainability. Thus, the properties in Theorem 1 are independent.
4 Dual results
In the literature on axiomatic claims problems, the dual of a characteriza-
tion can be derived by exploiting dual relations between rules, and between
properties of rules. Given a rule ', its dual, denoted by 'd, is obtained by
¯rst replacing the amount available with its \complement" (the di®erence
between the sum of the claims and itself), then applying ' to distribute
that di®erence, and ¯nally subtracting the resulting awards vector from
the claims vector. Formally, for each N 2 N and each (c;E) 2 CN,
'd(c;E) ´ c ¡ '(c;
P
i2N ci ¡ E). Clearly, the constrained equal awards
rule and the constrained equal losses rule are dual of each other (Herrero
and Villar [6]).
Similarly, any property can also be associated with its dual. We say
that two properties are dual if whenever a rule satis¯es one of them, its
dual satis¯es the other.12 The dual of sustainability and exemption are
\independence of residual claims" and \exclusion", respectively (Herrero
and Villar [5,6]). The dual of claims monotonicity is formulated by Thom-
son and Yeh [13]. Examples of the properties that are dual of themselves
are super-modularity (Thomson [12]), bilateral consistency (Herrero and
Villar [6]), converse consistency and order preservation (Thomson and
Yeh [13]).
Thus, the dual of Theorems 1, 2, and 3, are that the constrained
equal losses rule is the only rule satisfying independence of residual claims
and the dual of claims monotonicity (the dual of Theorem 1) or super-
modularity (the dual of Theorem 2), and that it is the only rule satisfying
12For a study of the dual relations between rules, and the properties of rules, see
Thomson and Yeh [13].
18exclusion, order preservation, and bilateral consistency (the dual of The-
orem 3). Similarly, the dual of Propositions 2, 3, 4, and 5 are that the
constrained equal losses rule is the only rule satisfying exclusion, the dual
of claims monotonicity, and bilateral consistency (the dual of Proposi-
tion 2) or converse consistency (the dual of Proposition 3), and that it
is the only rule satisfying exclusion, super-modularity, and bilateral con-
sistency (the dual of Proposition 4) or converse consistency (the dual of
Proposition 5).
5 Extensions
We extend the ideas of sustainability and exemption to groups of agents.
We say that the claims of a group of agents are \group sustainable" if
truncating all other claims at the arithmetic average of claims of that
group results in a situation where there is enough to fully compensate
everyone. The property, group sustainability, says that if the claims of a
group of agents are group sustainable, each agent in that group should be
fully compensated.
Group sustainability: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN, and each











· E, then 'N0 (c;E) =
cN0.
We show that such an extension of sustainability is extremely demand-
ing.
Theorem 4 No rule satis¯es group sustainability.
Proof. The proof is by means of an example. Let ' be a rule satisfying
the property. Let N ´ f1;2;3g, c ´ (1;5;5), and E ´ 9. Let x ´
'(c;E). Let N0 ´ f1;2g and N00 ´ f1;3g. Note that
P
i2N0 ci











= 9 = E. By group sustainability,
x1 = 1 and x2 = 5. Similarly, x1 = 1 and x3 = 5. Thus,
P
i2N xi = 11 > 9
in violation of
P
i2N xi = 9. Q.E.D.
19The intuition of Theorem 4 is that group sustainability may protect
agents whose claims are not sustainable. For instance, in the proof of
this theorem, the claim of agent 2 is not sustainable. However, when he
forms a group with agent 1, their claims are group sustainable. Then,
agent 2 is fully reimbursed by group sustainability, but not by sustainabil-
ity. The same reasoning applies for agent 3. Thus, all agents will be fully
compensated. That is impossible.
Next, we formulate a version of exemption for groups. We say that
the claims of a group of agents are \group exemptive" if the arithmetic
average of claims of this group is not greater than equal division. The
property, group exemption, says that if the claims of a group of agents are
group exemptive, each agent in that group should be fully reimbursed.





jNj, then 'N0 (c;E) = cN0.
As we show next, such an extension of exemption is very demanding
too. The intuition of this result is similar to that of Theorem 4.
Theorem 5 No rule satis¯es group exemption.
Proof. The proof is by means of an example. Let ' be a rule satisfying
the property. Let N ´ f1;2;3g, c ´ (1;4;5), and E ´ 9. Let N0 ´ f1;2g





3 = 3. By
group exemption, x1 = 1 and x2 = 4. Similarly, x1 = 1 and x3 = 5. Thus,
P
i2N xi = 10 > 9 in violation of
P
i2N xi = 9. Q.E.D.
6 Conclusion
We provided a systematic analysis of sustainability and exemption when
imposed together with other natural properties, and showed that sustain-
ability and exemption have strong implications. That is, in the presence
of very mild properties such as claims monotonicity, super-modularity, or
20order preservation, only one rule satis¯es sustainability and exemption sep-
arately, and this rule is the constrained equal awards rule. These results
furthered our understanding of the rule, and con¯rmed the importance it
has played in recent work. In addition, we extended the ideas of sustain-
ability and exemption to groups of agents, and found that no rule satis¯es
each of these extensions. These impossibility results suggested that taking
the arithmetic average of claims of a group of agents to extend the ideas
of the protective properties for groups is too demanding.
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22Appendix that is not part of the submission
for publication
To save space, we have included in this appendix, which is not for
publication, formal de¯nitions of certain rules and certain properties that
play auxiliary roles. We begin with formal de¯nitions of the proportional
rule, the Talmud rule, the Piniles' rule, the random arrival rule, and the
constrained egalitarian rule.
The proportional rule assigns awards proportional to claims.
Proportional rule, P: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN, and each
i 2 N, Pi(c;E) ´ ¸ci, where ¸ is chosen such that
P
i2N Pi(c;E) = E.
The Talmud rule is de¯ned by Aumann and Maschler [1] to rationalize
the recommendations made in the Talmud for several numerical examples.
It is a hybrid of the constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses
rules.

















where ¸ is chosen such that
P
i2N Ti (c;E) = E.
The Piniles' rule (Piniles [9]) can be understood as resulting from the
\twice" application of the constrained equal awards rule.
















where ¸ is chosen such that
P
i2N Pini (c;E) = E.
The random arrival rule (O'Neill [7]) is de¯ned on the basis of ¯rst-
come ¯rst-serve scheme associated with any particular order in which
23agents arrive, let us take the arithmetic average of the awards vectors
calculated in this way when all orders of arrival are equally probable.
Given N 2 N, let ¦N designate the class of bijections on N.
Random arrival rule, RA: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN, and

























The constrained egalitarian rule (Chun, Schummer, and Thomson [2])
is de¯ned as follows: assume that c1 · c2 · ¢¢¢ · cn. For amounts
available up to
P ci
2 , awards are computed as for the Talmud rule. At
that point, any additional unit goes to agent 1 until he receives his claim
or half of the second smallest claim, whichever is smaller. If c1 ·
c2
2 , he
stops at c1. If c1 >
c2
2 , any additional unit is divided equally between
agents 1 and 2 until they reach c1, at which point agent 1 drops out, or
they reach
c3
2 . In the ¯rst case, any additional unit goes entirely to agent
2 until he reaches c2 or
c3
2 . In the second case, any additional unit is
divided equally between agents 1, 2, and 3 until they reach c1, at which
point agent 1 drops out, or they reach
c4
2 , and so on.
Constrained egalitarian rule, CE: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN,















where ¸ is chosen such that
P
i2N CEi (c;E) = E.
Next is the formal de¯nition of composition down (Moulin [8]).
Composition down: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN, and each
0 · E0 · E, we have '(c;E0) = '('(c;E);E0).
24Now, we formally de¯ne the dual properties of sustainability, exemp-
tion, and claims monotonicity. We begin with the dual of sustainability.
We say that agent i's claim is \residual" if the aggregate excess claim
relative to this agent exceeds the worth of the amount available, namely
E ·
P
j2N maxf0;cj ¡ cig. Independence of residual claims requires that
if an agent's claim is residual, he should get nothing.
Independence of residual claims: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN,
and each i 2 N, if E ·
P
j2N maxf0;cj ¡ cig, then 'i (c;E) = 0.
Next is the dual of exemption. We say that agent i's claim is \ex-
clusive" if his claim is not greater than the average loss, namely, ci · P
j2N cj¡E
jNj . Exclusion says that if agent i's claim is exclusive, he should
get nothing.




jNj , then 'i (c;E) = 0.
The dual of claims monotonicity follows. It says that if an agent's claim
and the amount available increase by the same amount ®, this agent's
award should not increase by more than ®.
Dual of claims monotonicity: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN, each
i 2 N, and ® 2 R+, we have 'i (ci + ®;c¡i;E + ®) ¡ 'i (c;E) · ®.
In the context, we claim that '¤¤ is conversely consistent. Here we
provide a proof. The proof makes use of the facts that '¤¤ satis¯es \re-
source monotonicity"13 and order preservation. These facts are immediate
consequences of the de¯nition of the rule.
Claim 1 '¤¤ is conversely consistent.
13This property says that if the amount available increases, no one should receive
less than what he did initially. Formally, for each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN, and each
E0 > E, if
P
i2N ci ¸ E0, then '(c;E0) ¸ '(c;E).
25Proof. Let N 2 N and (c;E) 2 CN. Without loss of generality, we
assume that c1 · c2 · ¢¢¢ · cn. Let x 2 X (c;E) be such that for each





. Let y ´ '¤¤ (c;E). We
assume that jNj ¸ 3 since otherwise there is nothing to check. By the
de¯nition of '¤¤, y ´ CEA(c;E). We show that x = y.
Step 1: For each k 2 Nnf1;2g;xk = yk. Suppose, by contradiction,
that there exists k 2 Nnf1;2g such that xk 6= yk. Without loss of gener-




i2N yi, then there exists k0 2 Nnfkg
such that xk0 < yk0. Note that fk;k0g 6= f1;2g. By the de¯nition of '¤¤,
we have to apply the constrained equal awards rule to the situations in-
volving only agents k and k0. If xk+xk0 ¸ yk+yk0, then since CEA satis¯es
resource monotonicity, it follows that (xk;xk0) = CEA(ck;ck0;xk + xk0) ¸
CEA(ck;ck0;yk + yk0) = (yk;yk0). Thus, xk0 ¸ yk0 in violation of xk0 < yk0.
If xk + xk0 < yk + yk0, then since CEA satis¯es resource monotonicity, it
follows that (xk;xk0) = CEA(ck;ck0;xk + xk0) · CEA(ck;ck0;yk + yk0) =
(yk;yk0). Thus, xk · yk in violation of xk > yk.
Step 2: x1 = y1 and x2 = y2. Suppose, by contradiction, that x1 6= y1.
We consider two cases.





x1 + x2 = y1 + y2. Thus, x2 < y2. We consider three subcases.
Subcase 1.1: x1 + x2 · c1. By the de¯nition of '¤, x1 = 0. Since x1 > y1,
it follows that y1 < 0 in violation of y1 ¸ 0.
Subcase 1.2: c1 < x1 + x2 · 2c1. By the de¯nition of '¤, x2 = c1.
Let k 2 Nnf1;2g. Note that (x2;xk) = CEA(c2;ck;c1 + xk). Since
c1 · c2 · ck and x2 = c1, then xk =
c1+xk
2 . Thus, xk = c1. By Step 1,
yk = xk. Thus, yk = c1. Note that y2 > x2 = c1 and yk = c1. It follows
that yk < y2. Since c2 · ck and '¤¤ satis¯es order preservation, then
yk ¸ y2 in violation of yk < y2.
Subcase 1.3: 2c1 < x1 + x2 · c1 + c2. Let k 2 Nnf1;2g. Note that
(x2;xk) = CEA(c2;ck;x2 + xk). Since c2 · ck, then either x2 = c2 or
26x2 = xk (x2 =
x2+xk
2 ). If x2 = c2, then since x2 < y2, it follows that
c2 < y2 in violation of y2 · c2. If x2 = xk, then by Step 1, yk = xk. Thus,
yk = x2. Since x2 < y2, it follows that yk < y2. Since c2 · ck and '¤¤
satis¯es order preservation, then y2 · yk in violation of yk < y2.
Case 2: x1 < y1. We consider two subcases.
Subcase 2.1: x1 + x2 · 2c1. By the de¯nition of '¤, x1 · c1. Let
k 2 Nnf1;2g. Note that (x1;xk) = CEA(c1;ck;x1 + xk). Since c1 · ck
and x1 · c1, then either x1 = c1 or x1 = xk (xk =
x1+xk
2 ). If x1 = c1, then
since x1 < y1, it follows that c1 < y1 in violation of y1 · c1. If x1 = xk,
then by Step 1, yk = xk. Thus, yk = x1. Since x1 < y1, it follows that
yk < y1. Since c1 · ck and '¤¤ satis¯es order preservation, then y1 · yk
in violation of y1 > yk.
Subcase 2.2: 2c1 < x1 + x2 · c1 + c2. By the de¯nition of '¤, x1 = c1.
Since x1 < y1, it follows that c1 < y1 in violation of y1 · c1. Q.E.D.
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